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N
early all central banks, other than those that peg
an exchange rate, now explicitly communicate
policy changes through an announced target level
for a short-term interest rate. Notably, in 1999, the Swiss
National Bank replaced its monetary base target with an
operating target for the 3-month Swiss franc interbank lend-
ing (LIBOR) rate that the central bank adjusts as part of its
strategy to maintain price stability. One question that has
arisen with interest rate targets is whether a central bank
can cause the interest rate to move simply by expressing
its intention to establish a new target level—so-called open
mouth operations—or whether transactions of securities
in the central bank’s portfolio—open market operations—
are necessary to initiate a shift in interest rates. (See
Thornton, 2004, for such a study of U.S. monetary policy
in the 1970s.1)
A narrow definition of open mouth operations concerns
the ability of the central bank to achieve changes in its
target interest rate without corresponding open market
operations. A broader definition of open mouth operations,
however, would include the proposition that the central
bank can alter the slope of the yield curve at the very short
end (at maturities between the overnight rate and 3 months,
for example) through an announcement regarding a
target rate change. Here we consider such a case study
from the Swiss money market.  
The Swiss National Bank targets the 3-month
Swiss LIBOR rate, but it seeks to affect that rate by
entering into securities repurchase (repo) agreements
with commercial banks. The typical maturity of a repo
agreement is a week and the typical spread between
the 3-month LIBOR rate and the 1-week repo rate
is approximately 15 basis points. Twice in 2004, the
Swiss National Bank raised its target range for the
Swiss LIBOR rate by 25 basis points. The midpoint
of the target range is shown on the accompanying
chart. 
The market anticipated the first target change,
which accounts for the preceding spike in the LIBOR-
repo rate spread in June 2004. Nevertheless, money
market participants did not appear to realize that the
Swiss National Bank sought to implement the smallest
initial rise in the repo rate that would achieve their new
target for the LIBOR. The fact that the 3-month Swiss
LIBOR rate immediately rose by the full 25 basis points,
while the repo rate rose by only about 15 basis points,
suggests that the Swiss National Bank used open mouth
operations to increase the rate spread above its usual level
of 15 basis points. By the time of the second target change
in September 2004, however, the Swiss National Bank
did not achieve its objective of raising the Swiss LIBOR
rate by 25 basis points (to a level of 75 basis points) until
it had raised the repo rate to a level of approximately 60
basis points—that is, not until the typical rate spread of
about 15 basis points was restored. Together, these two
episodes suggest that policy announcements—open mouth
operations—can cause rate spreads to deviate temporarily
from their expected levels, although not necessarily on a
regular basis or for an extended period of time.
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